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Abstract 
The securitisation of youth as a social category has been well-documented. For the South and 
East Mediterranean (SEM) countries, moral panics over demographic youth bulges, Islamist 
radicalisation and protracted conflicts have placed youth centre-stage as a threat to the 
security of states and societies. Rejecting such assertions as themselves being what Foucault 
might have termed ‘technologies of power’ in a neoliberal order, and instead taking a critical 
approach to security, the spotlight is turned towards youth themselves as the referent object 
of study. This reveals the multidimensional hyper-precarity and insecuritisation of young 
peoples’ lives which derive from that same neoliberal economic order and the political 
structures that sustain it in the SEM countries.  The finding resonates with other studies of 
new, insecure, formats for adulthood in Africa and suggests that we should look at the 
insecurity of young people today to understand global neoliberal futures in countries beyond 
the post-industrial ‘core’. 
We do not use the form “This article does this or that …”. But please go ahead and improve 
what I did.  
Keywords: four or five please ??? 
 
 
Assertions of the securitisation of youth1 as a social category, and consequently of youth 
policy, are now well established. Nowhere is this more true than in studies of, and policy 
towards, young people in the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. Drawing on an 
historical dualism in referring to  youth which positions youth as hope of the nation against 
youth as threat to social order, contemporary securitisation focuses on the problems 
associated with a  demographic bulge at a time of low economic growth, political protest and 
upheavals, protracted conflict, unregistered migration and Islamic radicalisation.  Stanley 
Cohen remarked that “[s]ocieties appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of 
                                                                 
1 Arguments over appropriate definitions of youth are well-rehearsed and not especially helpful here 
(besides which, they could amount to a article in themselves). For the purposes of POWER2YOUTH, 
the limitations and inadequacies of biological boundaries for the category were recognised and a 
flexible and inclusive approach taken for the qualitative fieldwork. The survey component took youth 
as between the ages of 18 and 29 in order to exclude school-aged young people but include those 
accounted for in most INGO accounts. 
moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons, emerges to become defined as 
a threat to societal values and interests”2 and so it seems that Arab youth are taking centre-
stage in a new depiction of ‘youth as threat’.  
Critiques of this approach point to the hegemonic neoliberal context of political structures 
and policies, both within the region and in its interactions with the wider world. From this 
perspective, the securitisation of youth (that is, the creation of knowledge about youth which 
frames them as a threat to security) serves to subordinate young people, to control and govern 
them, and has little to say about the lives, experiences or aspirations of youth themselves.  
This article takes a critical approach to security, arguing that adjusting the referent object 
away from social order in the neoliberal context of SEM states and  towards the life 
experiences and perspectives of young people can give us a far better understanding of what 
constitutes security and for whom, making visible the array of (something missing here ???). 
Instead of reproducing frameworks of knowledge about youth which draw on moral panic to 
subordinate young  people to the security of the existing structures of power, it uncovers 
knowledge about how those structures impinge on young peoples’ own experiences of 
security, or the lack thereof. 
Drawing principally on the findings of the European Commission-funded POWER2YOUTH 
project,3 it argues that the lives of SEM youth are characterised by profound and multi-
dimensional insecurity, although this is experienced differentially according to the 
specificities of inter-sectional identities.4 This insecurity is multi-dimensional (economic, 
political, social, physical – even at times existential – and ontological), and results from the 
hyper-precarity of life on the front-line of neoliberal labour-force transformations in countries 
beyond the post-industrial core. Unlike post-industrial countries in Europe or North America, 
the SEM economies are not structured around the production and export  of knowledge-based 
goods and services but rather around agriculture, manufacturing,  trade in goods and 
relatively high levels of public employment and consumption. Decades of étatist 
development, followed by half-hearted liberal economic reforms, have left them with low 
levels of economic growth, weak international competitiveness, and all but stagnant labour 
markets, just as the demographic bulge has created dramatically heightened demand for jobs. 
Expectations around the school-to-work transition are frustrated by an insufficiency of jobs, 
heightened competition for what jobs are available, and the absence of alternative state-
provided forms of material support. The difficulties for SEM youth are compounded by the 
undemocratic, even authoritarian, political structures which govern them and which deny 
them the political, civil and human rights enjoyed by their counterparts in post-industrial 
countries. Increasingly reliant for extended periods on families and close social networks 
which privilege seniority and conservative social cultures, many young people are being 
                                                                 
2 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 9. 
3 The author wishes to acknowledge all the work done, and the spirit of collegiality and collective 
discovery in which it was undertaken, by the very many researchers engaged in the POWER2YOUTH 
project. 
4 Although this crucial dimension of the findings of POWER2YOUTH is not explored further in this 
article, the reader should bear in mind throughout the following discussions that, while youth has been 
somewhat and instrumentally homogenised here, the social category is inclusive of a wide range of 
diversities which suggest that the insecurities being described are experienced equally differentially.  
pushed into a condition similar to what Alcinda Honwana has claimed is a new format for 
adulthood in Africa – an indefinitely extended transition or waithood – amounting to a 
perpetual state of life-stage insecurity. This finding draws attention to the possibility that the 
future of the neoliberal global order is one in which there will be differentiated formats for 
adulthood according to the status and condition of local labour markets and the political 
structures which maintain them.  
 
The securitisation of youth 
The securitisation5 of youth has its roots in a  well established binary construction of youth as 
either the hope of the nation and an engine for development or, alternatively, unstable, 
deviant,  potentially degenerate, revolutionary and a threat to the security of the state and 
society as a whole.6 In the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries, as in many post-
colonial contexts, youth have carried an historic role in mobilising behind independence 
struggles, nationalist movements and early nation-building efforts.7 Their revolutionary and 
renovationary potential was initially revered in national myth although subsequently 
contained through corporatist and authoritarian institutional structures. However, high growth 
rates in the years of populist-welfarism resulted in a demographic bulge which made its mark 
felt in the 1990s. As the number and proportion of young people grew but economies 
stagnated and distributive states retrenched, the gap between the developmental costs of 
young people and the developmental return8 grew and youth were increasingly framed as ‘a 
problem’. The social imaginaries and policy frames around young people were recast such 
that they  collectively became “a political and security threat, a social and economic 
burden”.9  This janus-faced narrative has become embedded in development discourses at 
both national, and international, levels of policymaking. For example,  the 2016 Arab Human 
Development Report, a flagship regional annual report of the UNDP, said in recognising that 
two-thirds of the Arab region’s population is below the age of thirty: 
This unprecedented demographic mass of young people at the prime of their 
working and productive abilities constitutes a huge potential for advancing 
economic and social development if given the opportunity… . However, young 
people’s awareness of their capabilities and rights collides with a reality that 
marginalises them and blocks their pathways to express their opinions, actively 
participate or earn a living. As a result, instead of being a massive potential for 
building the future, youth can become an overwhelming power for destruction… . 
                                                                 
5 Nyman, “Securitization theory”. 
6 Cooper, “Re-thinking the ‘Problem of Youth’”; Hall, Adolescence; Merton, “Social Structure and 
Anomie”;  Sukarieh and Tannock, “The global securitisation of youth”. 
7  Bennani-Chraïbi and Farag, “Constitution de la jeunesse”, 13. 
8 The developmental costs of human resources include public and private investments in education, 
childhood health, family income support, etc., while the developmental returns refer to the 
individuals’ contributions to society through employment, taxation, and their private carrying of the 
costs of social reproduction.  
9  Catuse and Destremau, 2016: 23;  this reference is missing at the end ??? 
If the voices and potential of youth in Arab countries remain ignored, and formal 
or partial initiatives with no tangible impact on people’s lives continue to be 
implemented, youth will grow ever more alienated, prompting them to lose their 
capacity to act as constructive forces serving development. Rather, they will 
become a potent source of protracted social instability threatening human 
security… . This would in turn threaten the entire development process.10   
 
This troubling depiction is not unique to the SEM countries. Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart 
Tannock have eloquently  explained how the combination of moral panic surrounding the 
revived youth bulge theory, the effort to counter radical Islamist ‘terrorism’, and the 
instabilities and conflicts that comprised the Arab Spring and its aftermath, have all fed into a 
global securitisation of youth as a sub-text of development.11 This has been evident in a raft 
of institutional initiatives, including  the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 of 
December 2015 on Youth Peace and Security, which Sukarieh and Tannock locate within a 
trajectory of youth security initiatives including “the White House Summit on Countering 
Violent Extremism in February 2015; the European Youth Against Violent Extremism 
conference in June 2015; the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security in August 2015; 
the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism in September 2015; and the Arab 
Human Development Report 2016” (page number ???), the latter focusing exclusively on the 
role of youth in the Arab countries. “All of these are closely networked and mutually 
referential” (1).12 Such initiatives might be commended for their acknowledgement that 
young people are often the first to suffer from, or may be the most vulnerable to, conflict and 
insecurity, and also for their emphasis on empowering youth at the local, national and global 
levels, as “agents of positive change and peace”.13 But they are also deeply problematic for 
their assertions that young people themselves are disproportionately at the root of the 
problem, and for ultimately ignoring the structural determinants of conflict (including the 
configurations of power within and between  those élite institutions themselves and the 
governmental projects which comprise them).  
 
Lyndsay McLean Hilker has also challenged some of the underlying assumptions behind the 
securitisation of youth  and the binary positioning of youth as both victims and perpetrators 
of violence. She argues that demographic bulges matter most in terms of security impact  
when they interact with other factors such as prolonged periods of economic stagnation, poor 
governance, low access to education, absence of rule of law, political exclusion or inter-
ethnic inequalities. Even in times of conflict the majority of youths do not participate in 
violence, yet we know little about why they may choose to negotiate around or resist 
                                                                 
10 UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2016, 5-15. 
11 Sukarieh and Tannock, “In the best interests of youth?” 
12 The list is not exclusive: one can similarly point to OSCE Ministerial declarations in 2014 and 2014 
which  “promote youth participation in areas like preventing and countering violent extremism and 
radicalization that lead to terrorism, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, education, tolerance and 
non-discrimination and political participation” (OSCE, Youth, the World Vision Youth, the Peace and 
Security Consultation in Europe and  the December 2017 EU-Africa Summit on Youth, Security and 
Investment). 
13  Williams, “Youth, Peace and Security”, 1. 
violence. Instead, research and policy have been overly focused on the minority who do 
engage in violence. She suggests we might learn more by moving beyond simplistic 
monocausal (as in material incentives or accumulated grievances) explanations of how and 
why young people might become threats to security and stability).14 
A critical approach to studying youth and security challenges is to go still further  since it 
would assume that “security threats and insecurities are not simply objects to be studied, but 
the product of social  and political practices”.15  Knowledge about security, and by 
implication what might pose a threat to it, is not benign or neutral, but rather a product of a 
hegemonic order which establishes what constitutes security, whose security matters and how 
it should properly be promoted, protected and preserved. From this perspective, security and 
security-related policy, practice and discourse serve as Foucauldian technologies of power16 
for protecting and reproducing that  order. Sukareh and Tannock, among others, have  located 
the securitisation of youth within a hegemonic global neo-liberal project, advanced through 
international institutions and the national governments with which they partner.17 The 
security of neoliberal capital, its agents (governments, economic élites, international financial 
institutions, etc) and its structures (the nation-state, national institutions, etc) become the 
answer to the ‘security for whom’ question. The researcher can avoid becoming the unwitting 
agent of this ‘technology’ of power  by altering the referent object of study away from what 
prevailing discourses constitute as security, towards young people themselves. Understanding 
the experience of being young, referent to the social other, and in all its multiple dimensions, 
can enlighten us about the distributions of power  (including exclusions therefrom) and the 
‘technologies’ which impel, promote, govern and sustain violence and insecurity, making 
visible the determining impact of the hegemonic neoliberal order itself on security as it is 
experienced in the world inhabited by young people.  
 
POWER2YOUTH: The Multi-dimensional Insecurities of SEM Youth 
This multi-dimensionality of experience – inclusive of economic, political, social and cultural 
factors shaping young peoples’ lives in the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) – was 
central to  the EU-funded POWER2 YOUTH. The project, which involved 14 institutional 
partners from Europe and SEM countries, offered what it described as: 
a comprehensive multi- level, interdisciplinary and gender-sensitive approach to 
understanding youth in the South and East Mediterranean (SEM) region through a 
cross-national comparative design. The project did this by combining nation-wide 
surveys, interviews and in-depth analyses of the socio-economic, political and 
                                                                 
14 McLean Hilker, “Violence, Peace and Stability, 2. 
15 Coleman and Rosenow, “Security (studies) and the limits of critique”, 202. 
16 Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
17  Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?; Bessant and Watts, “‘Cruel Optimism’”; Murphy, 
“Problematizing Arab Youth”. 
cultural situations of youth on three levels: the macro (policy/institutional), the 
meso (organisational) and the micro (individual) level. 18 
 
The objectives of the project were not specifically or objectively related to investigations of 
security – either the security of young people, or young people’s relevance to the security of 
others. Rather the project, like its sister EU-funded FP7 project, SAHWA,19 was an 
investigation of sources of youth exclusion, pathways to inclusion and prospects for youth-
led change in the countries around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.  
The sum total of results from the numerous and extensive data sets, quantitative and 
qualitative, and from the range of analyses produced by the wider project team were 
summarised in a policy-oriented report which initially set out the nature of the multiple 
marginalisations experienced by youth, emphasising that these are experienced differentially 
depending on each individual’s   intersected identities.  Moreover, they were frequently not 
specific to youth but rather were by-products of structural economic and political deficits 
experienced by wider populations, albeit with youth being relatively more vulnerable to them 
due to latecomer status and lack of access to existing networks or institutions of power.20 The 
list did not vary a great deal from one that might be compiled by young people in many other 
places around the world which exhibit high rates of youth unemployment, low rates of formal 
political participation and a general disconnect between national narratives and the normative 
and sub-cultural frameworks of young people. Indeed the data collected from six countries 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Palestine, Turkey and Lebanon) provoked conversations which 
were well rehearsed in youth and youth policy studies: poor school-to-work transitions, 
higher than average unemployment, a failure to translate more education into better 
employment prospects, increased material dependence on family and solidarity networks as 
the state retrenches, new formats for – and spaces of – socialisation which challenge 
normative and ontological expectations, and  increased alienation from political systems 
which are unresponsive to concerns about  poverty, austerity, social justice, corruption and 
social exclusion.  
 
What was striking, however, was the extent to which the defining characteristic of young 
people’s everyday lives in SEM countries appeared to be insecurity. This finding was tested 
                                                                 
18 POWER2YOUTH: A Comprehensive Approach to the Understanding of Youth Exclusion and the 
Prospects for Youth-led Change in the South and East Mediterranean. This project received Euro 2.5 
million funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework programme for research, 
development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 612782. Quantitative and qualitative data 
was collected from a range of sources, including public statistics, public documents and academic 
studies, focus groups and interviews with relevant stakeholder and key informants (including young 
people and youth-based CSOs) and large-n nation-wide surveys of 7,573 young people aged between 
15 and 29. www.power2youth.eu. For survey results specifically, see Titnes et al., Young People in 
South East Mediterranean. 
19 SAHWA Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract,Project Number 
613174, included 15 member institutions and was led by CIDOB in Barcelona. 
20 Calder et al.,Marginalization, Young People in the South. 
against an additional  ten focus groups conducted by the policy report team during the period 
November-December 2016.21. Together with the original project data sets and findings, the 
focus groups found that insecurity pervades all dimensions of a young person’s life – 
economic, political, social, physical (even existential) and ontological. It is particularly 
pronounced for young women, although again every individual’s experience is different and 
reflects the composition of their intersected identities.  In degree and multi-dimensionality it 
is frequently sufficient such that apparently life-threatening mass migration or recruitment 
into radical political groups become normalised options. This article relies extensively on the 
voices of the participants in those focus groups, as well as the statistical data derived from the 
larger POWR2YOUTH survey, to demonstrate the insecuritisation of SEM  young people’s 
lived experiences. 
 
Degrees of precarious living  
 
Both POWER2YOUTH and SAHWA paid particular attention to the economic and, 
specifically, the employment challenges represented by the region’s demographic bulge. 
Youth-related public discourse and  policy, at both national and international levels, places 
employment centre-stage, not least because frustrations over the lack of jobs played a visible 
role in the Arab Spring protests of 2010-11. More significantly for the argument being made 
here, transformations in the global labour market lie at the heart of the neoliberal project. 
As aspirations to full employment have been abandoned, along with étatist commitments to 
job creation, youth globally have been reframed as a surplus supply – or reserve army – of 
labour. Policy discourses revolve around the school-to-work transition and providing the 
opportunities for young people to acquire the skills and capacities which will make them 
competitive against their peers. The focus of policy rests on education and training 
understood as social investments for a longer-term economic return.22 The notion that young 
people – if properly nurtured – can become independent contributors to society endorses the 
neo-liberal focus on the individual taking responsibility for their own welfare. However, as 
Filip Coussée et al.explain, this is anything but an emancipatory approach to youth.  They 
argue that, far from being a “positive and preventative paradigm”, it reaffirms a view of 
vulnerable youth as somehow being themselves deficient.23 After all, if youth do not 
‘develop’ the way that institutions and hegemonic ideological expectations dictate is best for 
society, then something is wrong with them. This approach is therefore  regulatory since 
young people are both responsible for their own employability yet must develop according to 
                                                                 
21 A total of 73 young people were included in this last round of focus groups, including 2 in Nablus 
(November 2016), 5 in Tunis (November 2016) and 3 in Beirut (December 2016). Each group 
included 3-11 individuals, including male (34) and female (39) participants from both urban and rural 
localities. The author would like to thank the British Council and Cathaginia (Carthaginia ???) in 
Tunisia, and ALHR in Lebanon, for their assistance in arranging the focus groups. A standardised 
template was utilised across all focus groups, although moderators were allowed some discretion in 
enabling participants to address local specificities. The focus groups were moderated directly by 
members of the work package team, aided in some instances by local translators,  and were conducted 
in Arabic/English as respondents felt comfortable. An effort was made to avoid duplicating 
respondents from the larger POWER2YOUTH data collection.    
22 Wyn and White, Rethinking Youth, 7. 
23 Coussée et al., “Empowering the Powerful”, 425.  
the needs of the labour market. It amounts, as James Côté suggests, to the proletarianisation 
of youth.24 
Despite this approach being firmly embedded in the youth, education and employment 
policies of the primary institutions of global  liberal capital, such as the World Bank, the 
United Nations, the OECD, the ILO and the IMF, they have proved far from successful in 
creating a match between labour supply and demand, especially when it comes to young 
people. By 2004, the International Labour Organisation was talking about a youth 
employment crisis as youth (defined as between the ages of 15 and 24) comprised 41.5 
percent of the total global unemployed. Since then, although rates of youth unemployment in 
developed economies have improved somewhat, they have worsened in the Asian regions, the 
Middle East and Africa (which include the SEM countries). Over all the global youth share of 
unemployment sat at 36.7 percent in 2014 and the youth unemployment rate remained at a 
global average of 13 percent.25 Of all regions, the MENA fared  worst, with  28.2 percent of 
young people in the Middle East and 30.5 percent in North Africa being reported as 
unemployed. These broad statistics, of course, disguise regional and gender variations which, 
for example, witness over 40 percent of rural Tunisian youth out of work and double the 
number of female as male youth unemployed.   
 
Unsurprisingly, POWER2YOUTH confirmed this picture of  insufficient job opportunities 
and subsequent unemployment, or under-employment, among SEM youth. Of over 7000 
young people surveyedin six countries,26 between just 28 percent (Palestine) and 51 percent 
(Morocco) considered themselves to be working. Between 7 percent (that’s very low !) 
(Lebanon) and 29 percent (Tunisia) described themselves as unemployed or discouraged, the 
rest being ‘out of the labour force’. Between 30 percent (Palestine) and 62 percent (Lebanon) 
described themselves as students which might suggest they were still building the skills and 
competencies needed by employers. However, for a large proportion of  SEM youth, further 
education (and subsequent qualification inflation) has failed to translate into employment 
opportunities. Between 19 percent (Turkey) and 38 percent (Tunisia) of respondents had 
post-secondary education, but only 2 percent (Egypt) to 18 percent (Turkey) of those 
employed had translated this into ‘professional’ or ‘managerial’ employment.   
 
Even when they were employed, young people’s work experience was fraught with 
insecurity. In the POWER2YOUTH survey only between 17 percent (Palestine) and 40 
percent (Lebanon) of those employed  had a formal contract for their employment, and 
between 53 percent (Morocco and Lebanon) and 72 percent (Egypt) were ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat’ afraid of losing their jobs. Although Turkey (at 74 percent) was an outlier, 
between only 13 percent (Egypt) and 38 percent (Lebanon) had access to health insurance 
through their employer, and between 36 percent (Lebanon) and 75 percent (Egypt) had no 
employer-provided benefits at all (again, Turkey was the exception at just 14 percent). 
Between 25 percent (Turkey) and 72 percent (Egypt) of those employed described their work 
                                                                 
24 Côté, “Towards a new political economy”. 
25 ILO, Global Employment Trends for Youth, 1-2.  
26 For the purposes of the survey, and to address reservations regarding the appropriateness of 
biologically determined definitions of youth, youth was defined as being between the ages of 18 and 
29 years. The countries were Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt. (Tiltnes and 
Pedersen, 2017) is this Tiltnes et al. ??? if it’s not, the reference is missing at the end ??? 
as temporary, seasonal or irregular. Only between 2 percent (Egypt) and 6 percent (Lebanon 
and Tunisia) held salaried (and considered as secure) public sector jobs. Between 24 percent 
(Lebanon) and 55 percent (Egypt) of  young people claimed they worked in dangerous 
conditions and between 24 percent (Lebanon) and 63 percent (Egypt) said they sometimes, 
hardly ever or never worked in healthy conditions.27  When it came to defending their labour 
interests, youth found little support. Between just 5 percent (Egypt) and 27 percent (Turkey) 
evidenced “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of trust in labour unions and only 3 percent or fewer 
thought labour unions were the best arena for enabling young people to have influence over 
their own interests. 
Employment for SEM young people is characterised then by increasing precarity, a concept 
indicating capital’s preference for insecure labour, that is, labour which does not enjoy the 
seven forms of labour security (labour market security, employment security, job security, 
work security, skill reproduction security, income security, and  representation security).28 (is 
it all right if I move the footnote to here ??? If not, the statement that these conditions are 
capital’s preference requires substantiation ???) As latecomers to the market and lacking 
institutional power and  capacity to resist, SEM  youth appear to be on the front-line of labour 
precarity and the buffer zone for the transformation of national (and by extension, in an era of 
economic liberalisation, global) labour markets.  
But the data demonstrates something more. As youth unemployment and under-employment 
in formal labour markets have expanded, SEM young people have made their way, when they 
can, into employment in the informal economy which has expanded just as rapidly in the 
post-étatist era in many middle-income and less developed regions. A 2010 review of 
informal labour markets by the World Bank found that informal economies in the broader 
MENA region typically produce around 27 percent of GDP and employ around 67 percent of 
the labour force.29 
 
Regional differentiation (and indeed spatial differentiation within regions and individual 
countries) is an important dimension of precarity. For Standing, precarity refers to the formal 
labour economy and post-industrial modes of production. Yet, 
 
[i]n most low-income countries, at least three in four young workers fall within 
the category of irregular employment, engaged in either own-account work, 
contributing family work, casual paid employment or temporary (non-casual) 
labour. Nine in ten young workers remain in informal employment. This 
compares to an only slightly improved share of two in three youth in the middle-
income countries.30 
 
                                                                 
27 Tiltnes et al., Young People in South East Mediterranean. 
28  Standing, The Precariat.  
29 reference required ??? 
30 ILO, Global Employment Trends for Youth, 2. 
Informal economies offer small-scale, short-term and low capitalisation opportunities for 
income generation, enabling young people to “get by”,31 to fill gaps between formal 
employment or education opportunities, and to manage small material spaces for themselves. 
However, they are by definition hyper-precarious, offering no social or legal protection and 
often including physical insecurity. They frequently traverse the boundaries of legality and 
illegality, marginality and criminality, reinforcing  the logic of narratives which place young 
people on the perpetual cusp of deviancy. Moreover, the informal sector often acts as a 
recruitment vehicle for networks with violent inclinations, specifically militant Islamist 
networks. As one young Lebanese focus group respondent said:  
 
There’s no point pushing education for some of the rural youth because they 
cannot access a university, cannot afford it and get an education. The only people 
offering rural youth anything are the recruiters (Islamic State) who offer them a 
future.32  
 
This recruitment is not necessarily for purposes of jihad, but also enables the financially-
motivated smuggling of goods, people and weapons across borders. This is an important 
means by which young people alleviate formal unemployment, poverty and exclusion, but at 
the same time it brings new insecurities. A study of the Kasserine region of Tunisia, for 
example, found that “The counter-terrorism agenda has now led to a situation where 
subsistence smuggling is conflated with criminality and the demands from young people in 
the region for social justice and inclusion are delegitimised.”33  
 
An alternative  option for navigating the employment gap lies in the smuggling of young 
people across the Mediterranean into Europe, often by other young people and with 
tremendous danger attached. (An alternative  option for navigating the employment gap lies 
in leaving one’s country or even crossing the Mediterranean into Europe, with tremendous 
danger attached. ???) A desire to take such risks and migrate, indicates a less than secure 
attachment to existing living conditions. Amongst survey respondents, young Tunisians 
showed the greatest desire to leave their country: although 94 percent of those surveyed by 
POWER2YOUTH had never travelled abroad before, 35 percent said it was very or 
somewhat likely they would travel to another Middle Eastern country in the next five years, 
and 45 percent said they were likely to travel to Europe. Moroccan youths were less likely to 
travel to the wider Middle East (23 percent), but 34 percent expressed an interest in Europe. 
Conversely, Palestinian youth were more likely to travel to the Middle East in search of a 
better living (37 percent) than to Europe (25 percent). Jobs featured high in reasons for 
migrating: “I love my country and I don’t want to move to another country… . But when we 
graduate from university we can’t find jobs. In other countries I think jobs are available.” 
Other motivations included a frustration with “the inefficiencies of everything” and a 
yearning for greater personal freedom. A young male in Nablus said,  
 
I want to have a life in Europe, it is an open life, like you do whatever you want and 
nobody will say that’s wrong and that’s right. Nobody can change your mind, nobody 
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can affect your opinion. Because here if you want to say something, maybe you will 
face a lot of problems.34  
 
As young people, and especially young men, consider their (limited) options, they are 
increasingly caught in a position of what Langevang has termed “wait and see”,35 hanging 
round in places where they might be offered temporary bouts of work. Visible crowds of 
young men, loitering and apparently purposeless, fill street corners, public squares and street 
cafés, contributing to public perceptions of deviancy, idleness and threat, even as they 
indicate the reality of youth’s own insecurity. 
 
A final dimension of the insecurity of SEM youth employment is the overarching importance 
of characteristics other than qualification in accessing employment opportunities in SEM 
countries. These not only contradict the mythology of the school-to-work transition, but add 
additional unpredictability and uncertainty to the labour market. Numerous reports have 
documented the importance of political party affiliation, for example, in accessing both 
employment opportunities and those associated with training and active labour market 
programmes formulated under the youth policy rubric and endorsed by international 
partners.36 However, it is arguably wasta, or having personal connections, which plays the 
greater role in securing and maintaining a job. Over 90 percent of all survey respondents in 
every country believed that wasta was either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important in accessing 
employment, and certainly far more important than qualifications or merit.37 As one focus 
group participant put it: “There’s not a lot of opportunities. We can work hard and get good 
grades but someone who lacks competence will get the job because of wasta”. Another young 
woman in Nablus said: 
 
I feel pessimistic about jobs. I graduated. Everyone needs an intermediary, for 
every opportunity, for work, you need wasta in these times. No wasta, no work. 
Even for training, you are supposed to get experience, but the training doesn’t 
help you get a job, only wasta.38  
 
Compounding precarity in the world of work is the insufficiency or absence of alternative 
sources of material security for young people. The withdrawal and targeting of subsidies, 
adjustments to social insurance and pensions regimes, widening income inequality, growing 
domestic debt, and the lack of affordable housing make it ever more difficult to achieve 
material security and consequently enter the significant social markets of adulthood such as  
marriage, leaving home, or starting a family. The POWER2YOUTH survey found that youth 
access to formal forms of support was limited. For example, between 47 percent (Lebanon) 
and 81 percent (Egypt) of young Arabs had no access to health insurance (although Turkish 
youth did relatively well with only 9 percent having no access at all). Between just 16 percent 
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(Egypt) and 58 percent (Morocco)  of employed workers had access to paid sick leave and a 
maximum of 36 percent (Turkey) were entitled to monthly stipend pension payments. The 
lack of financial security featured high in young people’s concerns, especially as they 
considered possibilities for independent living.  
As one focus group respondent said, “Even if you wanted to be independent you can’t 
because rent costs too much and the housing is all for families”. Another said, “There is no 
point planning for a mortgage or making any long term plans because you never know what’s 
coming”. Another suggested, “I might not be able to carry on with my studies if my father 
gets sicker”;  another young woman said,  “I am most anxious about what might happen if I 
lose my job and what will happen to my family”, and another, “We think about our futures all 
the time. We cannot waste time by having fun. For everything we do there is an opportunity 
cost” .39  
 
The social and political correlates of precarity in SEM countries 
The social implications, or accompanying costs, of this material insecurity are extensive. 
Foremost is the continued dependence on family networks for material support, despite 
achieving the physical, psychological and emotional maturity which supports personal 
autonomy. Between 53 percent (Tunisia) and 75  percent (Palestine) of survey respondents 
cited family and parents as accounting for their place of residence. Yet between only 29 
percent (Tunisia) and 50 percent (Lebanon) felt that their opinions were taken seriously by 
adult members of their family. They were most likely to discuss intimate aspects of their 
personal lives such as romantic relationships, friendship issues, being teased or bullied, 
sexual harassment, or gender issues with their friends, but were more likely to discuss issues 
relating to their material futures (such as education, migration, and employment) with their 
families. A dissonance thus arises between their social external persona (in which they 
display personal autonomy) and their ‘family’ persona where they remain in a  dependent 
child-like status. This is intensified by regimes mobilising socio-cultural norms which 
reproduce the dependence of young people on the patriarchal hierarchy of the family. 
Investigations of recent adjustments in family and personal status laws by POWER2YOUTH 
showed clearly that state policies in all countries are reinforcing the subordination of women, 
the supervisory powers of parents, and the normative power of conservative social culture.40  
 
This dissonance reverberates in the clash between public officially-sanctioned messaging 
about and for youth (such as youth-oriented TV and radio stations ) and more rebellious or 
resistant sub-cultures produced and reproduced through social media and popular culture.41  
Young people perform their differing and insecure social identities – at times those of 
autonomous adulthood, at other times those of dependent youth, navigating between them as 
they move through the different social realms of their lives. 
 
In their political lives too, young people are forced to live with a profound and grating  
dissonance between the populist, nationalist, participatory and often democratic discourses of 
regimes, performed through hollow institutions and carefully constructed policy frameworks 
on the one hand, and the reality of exclusivist, neo-patrimonial,  often authoritarian and even 
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gerontocratic political realities. Public discourses of youth and youth policy are 
instrumentalised to legitimise ruling elites, to distinguish the good (acquiescent) from the bad 
(rebellious or apathetic) youth, and to control them all.42 It creates categories of youth 
(unemployed graduates, NEETS, harraga, hittistes,43 street kids, terrorists, criminals, etc), 
which are embedded in institutions and  establish the “facts” of the “youth problem”.44 
Meanwhile, youth participation and representation is closely circumscribed, channelled either 
through discredited and youth-resistant political parties, civil society and social 
entrepreneurship networks which effectively depoliticise them, or so-called youth parliaments 
and youth pacts which offer voice but no genuine access to power.45 With corruption and the 
arbitrary application of law predominating, SEM youth expressed consistently low levels of 
trust in, or engagement with  all political institutions and some social institutions. In the 
POWER2YOUTH survey, parliaments, political parties and central governments were 
consistently trusted by less than 30 percent (and often less than 20 percent) of young people.  
 
When the formal institutions of society are unreliable and have little social buy-in, society at 
large becomes a place of insecurity, fear and even violence. Although families and extended 
families were largely trusted, only between 8 percent (Turkey) and 39 percent (Egypt) of 
respondents thought that most people can be trusted. Between 30 percent (Morocco) and 44 
percent (Palestine) said that they had either not very much trust or no trust at all in their 
neighbours. Between 34 percent (Lebanon) and 43 percent (Turkey) had not very much or no 
trust at all in their work colleagues and the vast majority in all countries had little or not trust 
in strangers, people of other religions or other nationalities. This can be accounted for in part 
by the way in which violence within societies goes unchecked by formal institutions.46 The 
coercive tendencies of SEM states, their lack of regard for human and civil rights, their 
willingness to enable, endorse or turn a blind eye to direct (violence ???) against citizens and 
their inability to curtail (or even collusion with) violence within society (manifesting itself in 
protection rackets, gang violence, human trafficking, domestic violence, sexual harassment in 
public places, even unregulated and dangerous public transport and infrastructure),  all mean 
that personal and physical insecurity is pervasive for young people and especially for young 
women. We were told by one female respondent: “We have to psychologically prepare 
ourselves for going out.” Others said,  “If someone well-connected hurts you, you can do 
nothing … and everyone is well-connected.”; “Even when I go out with my friends and we 
are four girls, I still do not feel safe.”47 A Tunisian respondent said, “It is as simple as not 
having anything to fear. As a young woman I think I would be fully safe if I could go out at 
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night and have a stroll without needing to fear anything, without fearing being raped or killed 
or robbed.” A Palestinian female remarked, “We are safe only in our families.”48  
 
Fear of violence impinging on young peoples’ capacity to be mobile beyond the home 
impacts on men as well. One Tunisian remarked, “The level of security threat is really high; 
you have bombing, stealing…”, while Palestinian young people  repeatedly referred to the 
constant sense of threat from Israeli soldiers.49 Fear of violence in response to political or 
civil activism from the state institutions was also common. One Tunisian male remarked, 
“Human rights violations are still being conducted in Tunisian prisons on a daily basis. These 
are real concerns for me”, while another said, “you cannot fall back on institutions like the 
police and believe you are secure; you are not.”50  
 
The omnipresent perception of threat or being surveilled was evident in survey responses to 
questions about freedom. For example, between just  21 percent (Palestine) and 47 percent 
(Lebanon) felt “completely free” to express their ideas and opinions in their communities; 
between 27 percent (Palestine) and 45 percent (Lebanon) felt free to express themselves 
freely on the internet; and just 11 percent (Palestine) and 36 percent (Lebanon) felt free to 
express themselves at the national level. The consequences of becoming visible to authority 
were not simply political: as one young Palestinian said:  
 
There’s a rule all young people know about: if you get involved in politics, 
sooner or later, you’ll end up in prison, whether it’s an Israeli or a Palestinian 
one. For a woman, the consequences can be devastating. Besides the physical and 
psychological effects of being in prison, there’s a risk that you’ll never find a 
husband, because this is still a very conservative society and there are all kinds of 
rumours than can harm a woman’s reputation if she’s been in prison.51  
 
It is worth reflecting that in the survey young people consistently rated security as equally or 
more important than democracy and nowhere more so than in Palestine and Lebanon (both 91 
percent). The impact of insecurity on well-being was also evident:  between 22 percent 
(Turkey) and 59 percent (Egypt) of young people said they had not felt “calm and relaxed” 
during the previous two weeks. 
 
Ontological insecurity and the future 
Thus, with lives (unequally and differentially) characterised by economic, social, political 
and physical insecurity, SEM youth find themselves marginalised not only from the body 
politik and society as a whole, but also from the narratives, discourses and meanings which 
construct them. It is not just a case of  inter-generational differences in expectation and 
entitlements inducing perceptions of relative deprivation, although that certainly plays a part: 
rather it is a shared form of ontological insecurity52 in which young people’s everyday bears 
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little or no relation to the present or futures which society as a whole constructs for them. 
Young people are forced, by coercion or by necessity, to live “as if”, as if their futures will be 
better (more prosperous,  more free and more safe), as if they are still transitioning to the 
format for adulthood which  is sustained by social benchmarks of material independence and 
personal autonomy, and political benchmarks of citizenship and participation. For many, if 
not most, however, the reality of living today is  profoundly different and offers few direct 
pathways or opportunities to make progress towards that future status.  As SAHWA 
researchers concluded: 
 
Many of the young people we spoke with shared similar narratives about the 
future: there wasn’t really any point in having an ambition because there was no 
sense of security.53 
 
As one young Tunisian man said, “All our anxieties are coming from our fears of the future”. 
A young Tunisian woman remarked, “My ambition defines me.; it is a part of my identity and 
if I cannot get to the future then my identity is missing as an independent woman.”54  
 
Instead, a painful aspect of these multiple- insecurities is the necessity for many SEM youth to 
live in what has been termed “the extended present”.55  Securing the present and avoiding risk 
becomes the young person’s life code. As one Lebanese youth said, “Whenever we make 
decisions we tend to go for safety – whether this is about money, education, walking in the 
streets.”56  
 
For a large part of the generational cohort, this resonates with a finding of Alcinda Honwana 
in her research on young people in Africa. The extended present, this profound insecurity of 
life-stage progression, becomes  a status of permanent ‘waithood’  and an  alternative format 
of adulthood.57  In a paradox of painful proportions, the world around SEM youth is changing 
rapidly, offering them a very different lived experience from that of their parents; yet  the 
possibilities for their own futures are diminished and many  seem stuck in a condition of 
constantly navigating the contradictions of the present, of ‘making do’ and ‘getting by’. 
Unable to progress to conventional adulthood, they lack a security of place and status which 
largely defines their experience as ‘youth’. 
 
Arguably, this kind of ontological insecurity of youth – this discrepancy between public 
norms, narratives and performances on the one hand, and lived meanings on the other – is 
nothing new. Much has been made in youth studies, and sociology more broadly, of the 
uncertainty of modern life.58   Zygmunt Bauman coined the term  ‘liquid modernity’ to 
describe  “the fluidity of norm, institution, and social category so characterist ic of our present 
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period”, while Jock Young describes the post-modern phenomenon of ‘vertigo’ (fear of 
falling or of  downward mobility), which he deems to be the condition of today’s  middle 
classes.59 But both these authors were referring principally to post-industrial, post-modern, 
globalised societies and – whilst they captured much of the fall-out from the transformatory  
impact of global liberal capital as it is experienced by SEM youth – they are less able to 
speak to the additional insecurities imposed by authoritarian political contexts and the semi-
periphery status of national economies. Nor  are they inclusive of the marginalising impacts 
of conflict, war, religious and cultural specificities.  So whilst youth globally might 
experience similar insecuritising impacts arising from their front-line status as hegemonic 
neoliberal capital  transforms global labour markets and economic conditions, the experience 
of SEM youth, as documented by POWER2YOUTH, suggests there are  locally-specific and 
multiplying impacts of ‘living beyond the core’ which amount in this case to hyper-precarity.  
 
SEM youth, (in)security and the neoliberal subject 
 
In 2011, Rob MacDonald asked the question: what are youth studies for? Since youth, being 
a socially constructed category, is defined variably in different locations and contexts and we 
cannot provide precision as to whom exactly is included in the object of study, he asked what 
analytical gain there is to be had from the study of youth, or young people, in any one 
specific context or location. He provides the answer himself: “the valuable, possibly unique, 
position youth research has as a window on processes of social change and social 
continuity…. If new social trends emerge it is feasible that they will be seen first, or more 
obviously, among the coming, new generation of adults.”60  
 
Contrasting with a dominant narrative of the securitisation of youth, this article has argued 
that the POWER2YOUTH research on SEM youth has unveiled a process of insecuritisation, 
creating and expanding the various components of an insecure life (what one might even 
think of as the antithesis of human security).  Lacking access to institutions and networks of 
power,  SEM young people are at the front-line of the precariatisation of the region’s labour 
force. The material insecurities created by precarious employment are compounded by 
political and physical insecurities generated by authoritarian (or at best non-democratic) 
regimes, the latter drawing on conservative socio-cultural constructions to legitimise the 
subordination of youth. As the narratives, discourses and policies  which are developed to 
control youth progressively diverge further and further away from the lived realities of young 
people themselves, SEM youth are experiencing acute forms of ontological insecurity. 
Moreover, like their peers in other peripheral locations, they are at risk of becoming locked 
into a status of  ‘waithood’ or ‘transition’, which is in reality an alternative version of 
adulthood and a potentially permanent state of hyper-precarious living.   
 
This argument suggests the urgency of  moving  beyond the current format of securitised 
framings of youth, especially when they have become as all-pervading as in regard to Arab, 
Muslim or ‘Southern’ populations . Claire Metelits has argued powerfully against the 
proposition that states are the agents best tasked with securing stability and that this is best 
achieved through the securitisation of discourse and policy.61 Securitising discourse on 
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populations, or sub-sets within them, by subordinating  them to a logic of state-led 
stabilisation, depoliticises them, depriving them of their own agency in determining what 
constitutes a  desirable stability. POWER2YOUTH tells us something more: security should 
not be understood as the necessary stability and preservation of the neoliberal order or the 
state which upholds it, but rather as an aspiration for the lived everyday experiences of the 
peoples under its governance. For SEM youth, hyper-precarious living – this multi-
dimensional insecurity – is the price they are paying for the ‘security’ of the prevailing 
political economy.   
 
Moreover, the experiences of SEM youth made visible by POWER2YOUTH, like those of 
Honwana’s respondents in Africa, suggest that when we look at youth today, we are looking 
through a window into the  future. The local insecuritisation of SEM (or indeed African)  
youth today is a foretelling of the global future of the neoliberal everyday and its spatial, as 
much as temporal distinctions.62 To be distracted by securitisation stories is to miss the lesson 
of future history and how it will differentiate the lives of all of us according to spatial and 
geo-economic location.  
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